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Lessons from the Dramatists Guild for the
Platform Economy
Matthew T. Bodie†

Even if we are a “nation of employees,”1 we have never labored
solely through employment. Independent contractors provide
contractually-based labor but without the employment connection.
Along with providing capital, owners often work for their businesses,
especially when they are sole proprietors or partners. Volunteers and
students labor without pay. The employment relationship is a legal
construct that designates the rights and responsibilities of a particular
kind of labor relationship, and, as with most legal categories, its
boundaries can be fuzzy in places. But this fuzziness heightens the
stakes when workers fall somewhere along the spectrum between
employment and another category. Over the years, we have layered an
ever-growing host of legal obligations on employment—from minimum
wages and healthcare obligations, to collective bargaining, FICA taxes,
and the work-for-hire doctrine.2 The question of employment status has
tremendous legal ramifications.
Because of the legal importance of the employment category, there
is significant pressure on businesses to push their workers out of the
category and escape its attendant costs. Such pressures have existed
since the New Deal, and the definition of “employee” has changed over
time in response to shifting political and economic winds.3 There have
†

Callis Family Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law; Visiting Professor, Harvard
Law School (Fall 2016). My thanks to participants at the 2016 Legal Forum Symposium on “Law
and the Disruptive Workplace,” particularly Catherine Fisk, for their thoughtful comments. I also
am obliged for questions and comments from participants at the NYU School of Law’s 68th Annual
Conference on Labor on “Who Is an Employee, and Who Is the Employer?” Thanks to Jon Jones
for research assistance, and to the University of Chicago Legal Forum editors for a terrific
conference and editorial process.
1
FRANK TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951) (“We have become a nation of
employees.”).
2
See Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
661, 666–74 (2013).
3
See id. at 674–94 (discussing changes in legal definition); see also Thomas J. Power, Fast
Food Sweatshops: Franchisors as Employers Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 19 CUNY L.
REV. 337, 340 (2016) (“The FLSA was passed at the height of the New Deal, and in addition to
articulating a federal minimum wage and overtime protections, the FLSA defined ‘employ’ in a

17
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always been industries and employers that label their workers as
independent contractors despite legal uncertainty over the label, and
courts have long parsed the definition to determine who is in and who
is out.4 However, the arrival of the platform economy5 has brought with
it a new approach to the working relationship—one for which there is
no firm consensus as to its legal categorization. Lawsuits involving
Uber and other platform companies continue to proliferate, and few
suits (if any) have reached resolution.6 The legal category of
employment is deeply unsettled, and a new approach to the law of
individual labor may be in the offing. Indeed, we may be heading into a
“post-employment” economy—a world in which employment is no
longer a meaningful legal or economic category.7
Dramatists—those authors who write plays, musicals, or operas for
performance8—have long existed in the legal and economic nether
region between the categories of employee and independent contractor.
Since the 1940s, dramatists have been considered independent
contractors and have generally owned the copyright to their work.9
However, dramatists have struggled with the independent contractor
distinction and have often sought to act collectively in setting the terms
and conditions for their work. Indeed, officials with the Dramatists’
Guild of America (Guild) have bemoaned the inability of dramatists to
supremely expansive way.”).
4
Jean Tom, Is a Newscarrier an Employee or an Independent Contractor? Deterring Abuse of
the “Independent Contractor” Label via State Tort Claims, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 489, 493 (2001)
(contending that the newspaper industry “actively promotes the idea that its delivery workers are
independent contractors, even as workers, courts, and the IRS have challenged this practice”).
5
See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 89 (2016) (using the term
“platform economy” while also acknowledging alternative terms such as “the sharing economy,”
“the peer-to-peer economy,” “the human-to-human economy,” “the on-demand economy,” “the gig
economy,” and “the Uberization of everything”). But see Steven Greenhouse, The Whatchamacallit
Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/opinion/the-whatchama
callit-economy.html [https://perma.cc/4KPF-XMBP] (“It’s a hip, fast-growing sector of the economy, filled with headline-grabbing companies: Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, Task Rabbit. But there’s a
gnawing problem: People aren’t sure what to call it.”).
6
Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work, 37 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 578 (2016) (“While many lawsuits have been filed, there have been no
definitive resolutions . . . .”).
7
Alan Hyde, Employment Law After the Death of Employment, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99,
101 (1998) (proposing in 1998 that “there is little reason to anticipate either a renaissance of
collective bargaining or much growth for implicit contracts for career employment”).
8
See David Leichtman, Most Unhappy Collaborators: An Argument Against the Recognition
of Property Ownership in Stage Directions, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 683, 684 (1996) (defining
dramatist or dramatic author as “a playwright, or in the context of a musical or opera, the
combination of composer, lyricist and bookwriter”).
9
Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 652 (2d Cir. 1945) (finding that the labor exception to antitrust
does not apply because dramatists were independent contractors); Jessica Litman, The Invention
of Common Law Play Right, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1381, 1419–20 (2010) (discussing the genesis
of the industry consensus surrounding dramatists’ ownership of the copyright).
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set minimum terms as a group,10 and Congress has considered
legislation to allow them to pursue collective representation,
bargaining, and minimum terms agreements.11 Dramatists are pulled
by competing desires: they want the power of collective action when
negotiating with others, but they want to retain their independence as
artists within a larger process.
The dramatists’ dilemma—independence and control versus
solidarity and submersion—reflects the dilemmas posed to workers in
the new platform economy. Do they revel in the freedom and the
flexibility that the platform offers? Or do they seek to join together with
other platform laborers in getting a better deal? The categories of
independent contractor and employee are thus neither legally
irrelevant nor archaic; they are instead a useful proxy for determining
which way platform employees can and should structure their labor
relationships. If platform workers want to prioritize their
independence, their control over the work, and their intellectual and/or
reputational property in their labor, they should choose the
independent contractor route. But if they are working together for a
company that exercises control over their jobs and their brand, in ways
that elevate their collective efforts as a whole, they are working as
employees.
This essay explores the dramatists’ employment dilemma and
explains why this dilemma helps illuminate our thinking about the
future of employment. Part I discusses the structuring of dramatists’
work and compares that structure to those of screenwriters and literary
authors. Part II discusses the platform economy and the reasons why
platform workers are causing such categorization issues. Finally, Part
III discusses how issues surrounding platform workers are reflected in
the dramatists’ dilemma, and how that dilemma should inform the
economic structuring and legal categorization of platform jobs.

10

See John Weidman, The Seventh Annual Media and Society Lecture: Protecting the
American Playwright, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 639, 640 (2007) (discussing the DGA’s role in “the
development of a series of standard contracts the terms of which have guaranteed to playwrights
the ability to control the content of the plays which they write, to control the disposition of those
plays, and to earn a living from those plays if and when they are produced”); see also Ashley Kelly,
Bargaining Power on Broadway: Why Congress Should Pass the Playwrights Licensing Antitrust
Initiative Act in the Era of Hollywood on Broadway, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 877 (2008); Alison Zamora,
The Playwright Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Empowering the “Starving Artist” Through the
Convergence of Copyright, Labor, and Antitrust Policies, 16 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 395
(2006).
11
See Kelly, supra note 10, at 905–15 (discussing proposed congressional legislation between
2001 and 2004, such as the Fair Play for Playwrights Act of 2001 and the Playwrights Licensing
Antitrust initiative (PLAI) Act of 2004).
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THE DRAMATISTS’ DILEMMA

Dramatists are authors of dramatic works. They include
playwrights, composers, lyricists, and bookwriters. Dramatic works can
stand on their own as literature; the plays of William Shakespeare and
Tennessee Williams still enjoy brisk sales. However, such works are
ultimately written to be produced. The dramatic text is meant to be
spoken in a live theater; the sheet music is meant to be played by
instruments and sung by voices. The dramatist is thus at once an
independent artist and a collaborator on a team production.12
Although the law is now seemingly settled that dramatists are
independent contractors (and not employees), the economic reality has
long been somewhat murkier. In fact, dramatists originally organized
as employees, with the Dramatists Guild serving as a labor union.13 The
Guild primarily sought, and has since zealously defended, the
dramatists’ continuing intellectual property (IP) rights over their
work.14 The means for promoting these rights, along with other
contractually-based minimums, had been the Guild’s Minimum Basic
Agreement. In the early days of Broadway, the Guild negotiated with
theater producers to adopt the Agreement for their productions. Like
other collective bargaining agreements, the Agreement set forth
required terms such as minimum royalties, lengths of terms, and a
grievance-arbitration system to cover disputes.15 In Ring v. Spina,16
however, a producer challenged the Agreement in court on antitrust
grounds, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a
pre-trial injunction against the enforcement of the Agreement.17 As part
of its ruling, the court cast doubt on the idea that dramatists were
employees and producers employers:

12

Shakespeare himself was a founding member of an acting company as well as a shareholder
in the Globe Theatre. Diana Price, Evidence for A Literary Biography, 72 TENN. L. REV. 111, 133–
34 (2004).
13
Ring, 148 F.2d at 651 (“The Guild contends, however, that it is a labor union . . . .”).
14
Litman, supra note 9, at 1386 (“The strong copyright-like rights that playwrights enjoy
today are chiefly contractual, secured for them in 1926 by the collective action of members of the
Dramatists’ Guild, who claimed to be a labor union and thus entitled to an antitrust exemption.”).
15
Ring, 148 F.2d at 649 (“The Basic Agreement, among other things, fixes the minimum terms
under which the Guild permits any of its members to lease or license a play, including the
minimum advance payments and the minimum royalties to be paid by a manager. It limits
contracts by both managers and authors to those made under its own terms, and between
managers and members, both of whom are ‘in good standing’ with the Guild. It also provides that
any dispute shall be finally adjudicated by arbitration.”).
16
148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945).
17
Id. at 650.
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[N]one of the parties affected are in any true sense employees.
An author writing a book or play is usually not then even in any
contractual relation with his producer. If and when he does
contract, he does not continue in the producer’s service to any
appreciable or continuous extent thereafter. . . . The minimum
price and royalties provided by the Basic Agreement, unlike
minimum wages in a collective bargaining agreement, are not
remuneration for continued services, but are the terms at which
a finished product or certain rights therein may be sold. And no
wages or working conditions of any group of employees are
directly dependent on these terms. We think the [labor]
exception [to federal antitrust laws] therefore inapplicable.18
The Ring court’s conception of dramatists’ employment status has held
throughout the years, albeit without direct reaffirmation.19 When the
Guild was sued for antitrust violations in the 1980s, the court ruled
against the motion to dismiss,20 and the Guild and the League of New
York Theatres and Producers eventually settled the case by
promulgating an Approved Production Contract for Plays and Musical
Plays (APC).21 However, this model agreement is not binding on the
parties; it represents only suggested terms.22 Because the Guild could

18

Id. at 652.
Federal courts have relied on the dramatists’ precedent to hold that composers are
independent contractors. See Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 517 F.2d 976, 980 (2d Cir. 1975)
(“Indeed, the record suggests that the composers contract for a specific output, work at their own
pace at home, and are not subject to day-to-day supervision by the producers. It may be,
consequently, that the producer has no right to control the manner in which work is performed, so
that . . . the composers are independent contractors.”); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79
F.R.D. 59, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (same). However, stage directors have been held to be employees.
See Julien v. Soc’y of Stage Directors & Choreographers, Inc., No. 68 CIV. 5120, 1975 WL 957, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1975) (“In sharp contrast to the playwrights in the Ring case and the lyricists
in the Bernstein case, we think that defendant here demonstrated at trial that directors are
employees of producers. It became clear to us during the course of the trial that the producer has
the right to and does exercise control over all facets of a production and of the director’s work.”).
20
Barr v. Dramatists Guild, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). (“Whether a
particular group of individuals is entitled to claim the labor exemption from the antitrust laws
cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss.”).
21
See Leslie Bennetts, Writers and Producers Reach Contract Accord, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27,
1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/02/27/arts/writers-and-producers-reach-contract-accord.html
[https://perma.cc/5262-TTJ6].
22
Id. (“While the new agreement was unanimously approved by the executive committee of
the League and the full council of the Guild, like the old contract it carries no force of law. Industry
observers expressed uncertainty over the degree to which the new contract would succeed in
standardizing agreements in an arena where there have long been wide discrepancies based on
the respective strength of negotiating parties.”); see also DONALD C. FARBER, PRODUCING THEATRE:
A COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL AND BUSINESS GUIDE 39 (3d ed. 2006) (“The net effect has been an
erosion of the strict control that the Guild had been able to impose on First-Class Production
contract terms in the past.”).
19
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still potentially be liable for antitrust violations for subsequent
restraints of trade, it cannot advocate for any changes to the APC
without the producers’ approval. With the producers showing no
interest in any changes, the APC has not been modified since its
original creation in 1985.23
The tortured history of the Guild’s negotiations and litigation with
the consortium of mainline producers, now known as the Broadway
League,24 demonstrates the dilemma facing dramatists as they seek to
manage their relationships with producers. The Guild was formed as a
union, repeatedly asserted that it was a union, and now laments that it
cannot serve as a union. Like most unions, the Guild sought to provide
a standardized basic agreement that would set minimum terms for the
industry, and individual dramatists would then be free to negotiate
higher terms based on their individual market power. However,
because of the legal determination that dramatists are not employees,
the Guild cannot exercise the powers of representation and collective
bargaining.25
If the Dramatists Guild did have these powers, however, it might
very well use them to reinforce the independence of dramatists. In
discussing the terms that dramatists should incorporate into their
contracts, the Guild emphasizes above all else the importance of
keeping copyright over dramatic works as a way of maintaining artistic
integrity. The Guild’s “Bill of Rights” states in its preamble: “In order
to protect the dramatist’s unique vision, which has always been the
strength of the theatre, s/he needs to understand this fundamental
principle: dramatists own and control their work.”26 Former Guild
President John Weidman described the principle this way: “The
playwright’s undisputed ownership of his play, legally and
artistically . . . has been the bedrock constant around which all theatermaking has been organized.”27 Laying out this principle more
23

See Kelly, supra note 10, at 904 (“[T]he Dramatists Guild continues to be prevented from
negotiating the APC by collective bargaining.”)
24
The League changed its name in 2007. Andrew Gans, League of American Theatres and
Producers Announces Name Change, PLAYBILL (Dec. 18, 2007), http://www.playbill.com/article/
league-of-american-theatres-and-producers-announces-name-change-com-146262 [https://perma.
cc/H9G8-R4JT]. The League represents theatre owners and producers, Broadway presenters,
general managers, and other Broadway industry professionals. Id. It negotiates with unions
representing theater employees such as actors, musicians, choreographers, and stagehands.
25
See ROBERT M. JARVIS ET. AL., THEATER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 80 (2004) (“Because
producers typically have the upper hand in negotiations, the [Dramatists] Guild has wanted to
engage in collective bargaining but cannot do so—as a trade association rather than a labor union,
its activities are not shielded from the federal anti-trust laws.”).
26
Dramatists Guild, Bill of Rights (last visited Jan.13, 2017), http://www.dramatistsguild.
com/billofrights/ [https://perma.cc/2HTE-PUUW].
27
Weidman, supra note 10, at 641.
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specifically, the Guild’s Bill of Rights instructs dramatists: “You own
the copyright of your dramatic work. Authors in the theatre business do
not assign (i.e., give away or sell in entirety) their copyrights, nor do
they ever engage in ‘work-for-hire.’”28 Public performance rights to one’s
dramatic property are only to be leased “for a finite period of time.”29
The Bill of Rights further states: “You own all approved revisions,
suggestions, and contributions to the script made by other collaborators
in the production, including actors, directors, and dramaturgs. You do
not owe anyone any money for these contributions.”30 The playwright,
composer, or lyricist stands alone in her control over the dramatic
work—at least, in the conception of the Guild.
However, modern theater production has put increasing strains on
this ideal of independence. Movie studios such as Disney and
DreamWorks have brought successful motion picture franchises, such
as The Lion King and Shrek, to Broadway.31 These studios own the
intellectual property that forms the foundation for these productions.
Moreover, films have long been produced with very different
expectations on the allocation of IP rights. In a marked break from the
dramatists’ approach, screenwriters have long ceded their copyright to
the studios and producers that employ them.32 They have been firmly
encamped in the “employee” category from the beginning and have
bargained with the studios through their union, the Writers Guild of
America (WGA).33 Rather than retaining copyright, screenwriters
receive residuals through a complicated formula that is continually
renegotiated over time.34 The WGA’s Minimum Basic Agreement (MBA)
also provides for minimum compensation for screenwriting work such
as completed drafts,35 as well as processes for regaining certain IP

28

Dramatists Guild, supra note 26.
Id.
30
Id.
31
Kate Feldman, ‘Shrek,’ ‘The Lion King’ and the Movies that Moved from Animation to
Broadway, on the 15th Anniversary of the Big Green Ogre, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 18, 2016), http://
www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/movies-moved-animation-broadway-article-1.2639967 [htt
ps://perma.cc/AZ8T-BCZN].
32
See Catherine L. Fisk, Will Work for Screen Credit: Labour and the Law in Hollywood, in
HOLLYWOOD AND THE LAW 235, 240 (2015) (“Writers first agreed to give up the copyright in their
work in the very early history of film production . . . .”). However, as Fisk points out, the work-forhire bargain “occasionally . . . has been criticized and questioned.” Id.
33
Id.
34
See id. at 244–48 (discussing the origin of residuals and their increasing scope of coverage
to include television broadcasts, DVD sales, and the internet).
35
Catherine L. Fisk, The Role of Private Intellectual Property Rights in Markets for Labor and
Ideas: Screen Credit and the Writers Guild of America, 1938-2000, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
215, 276 (2011) (“Through control of screen credit and the compensation that turns on it, the
Writers Guild has created a system of private intellectual property rights that is as important as
29
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rights over time and determining authorship of jointly written works.36
The WGA’s arbitration system for establishing screen credits—and
thereby not only residuals but also public recognition—is arguably the
union’s most important contribution to its members.37
Dramatists have derided the screenwriting system as a devil’s
bargain in which artistic control is given away for mammon:
As legal author of the film, that studio can change the content of
the screenwriter’s script at will. His pirate captain can become a
teenage runaway, his teenage runaway a Cocker Spaniel, his
original story, set in Boston during the War of 1812, can be
moved to the fifth moon of Jupiter.
Sooner or later, things like this will happen, because things like
this always happen, and when they do, the screenwriter will feel
talentless, humiliated, and, most importantly, every single
author’s impulse that made him want to be a writer in the first
place will be ground into the dust.
....
So why would anyone choose to write for the movies when they
could write for the theater? The answer is—as it so often is—
money.38
This clash of cultures can be seen in the movie production of Broadway
hit Into the Woods. Speaking to an audience of high school drama
teachers, composer and lyricist Stephen Sondheim confessed that
Disney had pressed for changes for their movie version, including
cutting one song and sparing one character from death.39 A furor
resulted over this instance of Hollywood messing with the singular
work of one of Broadway’s most revered talents.40 Sondheim was
copyright to the operation of both labor and product markets in Hollywood.”).
36
Id. at 262, 266. Fisk provides a comprehensive account of the WGA’s approach in her new
book. CATHERINE L. FISK, WRITING FOR HIRE: UNIONS, HOLLYWOOD, AND MADISON AVENUE 144–
168 (2016).
37
Id. at 235; see also John August & Craig Mazin, Scriptnotes Ep. 20: How Credit Arbitration
Works, Transcript for Scriptnotes Podcast, Jan. 18, 2012, https://johnaugust.com/2012/scriptnotesep-20-how-credit-arbitration-works-transcript [https://perma.cc/254K-5PC8] (discussing arbitration system for screenwriting credit).
38
Weidman, supra note 10, at 641–42.
39
Larissa MacFarquhar, Master Class, NEW YORKER (June 23, 2014), http://www.newyorker.
com/magazine/2014/06/23/master-class-4 [https://perma.cc/2TNU-4DKY].
40
Margaret Lyons, Sondheim Corrects Record on Into the Woods Changes, VULTURE (June 23,
2014), http://www.vulture.com/2014/06/sondheim-corrects-record-on-into-the-woods-edits.html [ht
tps://perma.cc/FFG3-UBUF].
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eventually moved to say that he and the show’s original book author
“worked out every change from stage to screen with the producers
and . . . the director,” and that “the collaboration was genuinely
collaborative and always productive.”41 In other words, Disney was not
in charge.
With such a strong cultural commitment to individual control,
dramatists have often conflicted with other artisans and laborers in the
theater industry. Dramaturgs are editors and/or managers who work
with the dramatist, generally for a fee, to create the final product, but
they have not been afforded any copyright participation.42 One
dramaturg—a playwriting professor—sued the estate of playwright
Jonathan Larson for co-authorship status for the musical Rent.43 Even
though the professor allegedly participated in a “radical transformation
of the show,” the Second Circuit held that the pair intended to have a
traditional dramatist-dramaturg relationship, not one of coauthorship.44 Stage directors and choreographers have mounted a more
sustained effort to obtain copyright protections for their stage directions
and specific choreography for a particular production.45 Although these
rights do not infringe upon the dramatist’s rights to the play itself, they
complicate the dramatist’s control over future productions.46 As a
result, it is in dramatists’ interests to concentrate IP rights to the
production in their own hands. Although the issue of stage direction
copyright is not completely settled, courts have not found in favor of the
41

Id.
Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 197 n.5 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted) (“Dramaturgs
provide a range of services to playwrights and directors in connection with the production and
development of theater pieces. . . . [T]he role of the dramaturg can include any number of the
elements that go into the crafting of a play, such as actual plot elements, dramatic structure,
character details, themes, and even specific language.”).
43
Id. at 195.
44
Id. at 205. See also Recent Case, Copyright—Joint Authorship—Second Circuit Holds That
Dramaturg’s Contributions to the Musical Rent Did Not Establish Joint Authorship with
Playwright-Composer—Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998), 112 HARV. L. REV. 964,
968–69 (1999) (arguing for a clearer rule to address co-authorship issues).
45
Margit Livingston, Inspiration or Imitation: Copyright Protection for Stage Directions, 50
B.C. L. REV. 427, 429 (2009).
46
As David Leichtman explained:
42

[D]irectors have sought further power through the courts by alleging intellectual
property rights in their work. This attempt pits stage directors and dramatists, who
must work closely together as artists, directly against one another in the legal arena.
For one thing, if stage directors are found to have rights which survive the closing of a
production, the publication of dramatic works will be radically affected. The printed
version of the work, which normally incorporates most aspects of the premiere will cease
to be a complete record, as it is meant to be, of the “defining” production in which the
dramatist participated and approved of changes in the staging.
Leichtman, supra note 8, at 688.
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stage directors and choreographers.47 Some commentators have even
argued that stage directions are not copyrightable.48 Thus far,
dramatists have remained alone in their control and power over the
intellectual property of the stage.
The dramatists’ position is enviable and has drawn criticism along
the line of the “have your cake and eat it too” variety.49 A number of
prominent legal academics have, in fact, called for a curtailment of
dramatists’ IP rights in order to provide greater rights or freedoms to
other participants.50 Dramatists—not surprisingly—see it differently.51
The independence of a singular author’s vision is still championed.52
Despite their strong attachment to the notion of the individual artist,
however, dramatists have still pushed for changes in the law to allow
greater coordination amongst themselves. One proposed piece of federal
legislation, the Playwright Licensing Antitrust Initiative (PLAI) Act,
would have allowed dramatists to bargain collectively over a new
standard agreement without violating the antitrust laws.53 Even with

47

See, e.g., Mullen v. Soc’y of Stage Dirs. & Choreographers, No. 06 Civ. 6818, 2007 WL
2892654 (N.D. Ill Sept. 30, 2007); Einhorn v. Mergatroyd Prods., 426 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y.
2006); Deana S. Stein, “Every Move That She Makes”: Copyright Protection for Stage Directions
and the Fictional Character Standard, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1571, 1572 (2013) (finding that “no
court has upheld a copyright claim in stage directions”).
48
Leichtman, supra note 8, at 696–707. But see Livingston, supra note 45, at 486 (“Certainly,
a straightforward application of traditional copyright law would dictate that stage directions are
subject to copyright protection.”); Stein, supra note 47, at 1574 (arguing that “stage directions can
be afforded copyright protection in limited instances”).
49
See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Invention of Common Law Play Right, 25 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1381, 1382–83 (2010) (“Playwrights, finally, insist that other creators who contribute
significant creative expression to licensed productions of their scripts have added no authorship
and should receive no copyright protection for their additions.”).
50
See, e.g., id. at 1424–25 (arguing that idea of a common law “play right” has been
exaggerated and overstated); Michael W. Carroll, Copyright’s Creative Hierarchy in the Performing
Arts, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 797 (2012) (arguing that a dramatist’s “rights of creative control
are too strong when applied to the performing arts because they fail to take account of the mutual
dependence between writers and performers to fully realize the work in performance”); Catherine
Fisk & Alisa Hartz, Fair Treatment of Theatre Labor: A Right to Perform Plays, ONLABOR,
(June 27, 2016), https://onlabor.org/2016/06/27/fair-treatment-for-theatre-labor-a-right-to-perform
-plays/ [https://perma.cc/285H-BQJ2] (making the case for a statutory license to perform plays as
a way of limiting dramatists’ power over performances).
51
Leichtman, supra note 8, at 726 (“To reinvest them with the strong grant originally
intended by the copyright law, dramatists should be relieved of the fear that their collaborators
are lurking in the shadows with a pencil and a script.”).
52
See, e.g., U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HEARING, S. 2349: The Playwrights
Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding the Future of American Live Theater, 108th Cong.,
2d Sess., April 28, 2004, p. 12 (testimony of Wendy Wasserstein) (“[T]he independent voice that
makes writing for the theater so compelling has become more and more endangered as the
production of plays are [sic] increasingly dominated by corporate interests.”).
53
PLAYWRIGHT LICENSING ANTITRUST INITIATIVE ACT OF 2005, H.R. 532, 109th Cong. (2005);
PLAYWRIGHT LICENSING ANTITRUST INITIATIVE ACT OF 2004, S. 2349, 108th Cong. (2004).
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bipartisan support, however, the legislation has not been passed. The
dramatists’ dilemma persists.
II. PLATFORM WORKERS AND THE EMPLOYMENT CONUNDRUM
The New Deal labor and employment legislation made employment
status into a significant legal category. Employees are generally defined
by the “control” test.54 The test finds its historical roots in the definition
of “servant” in English common law. According to the Restatement
Second of Agency, “[a] servant is a person employed to perform services
in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct
in the performance of the services is subject to the other’s control or
right to control.”55 Acknowledging that the concept of employment is
“one not capable of exact definition,”56 the Restatement provides ten
factors to fill out the basic control standard.57 The control test is used
both in the common law and for most federal and state statutes and
regulations.58 In the wake of the New Deal, there was the possibility of
a broader approach: the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) did not
54

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (quoting Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–740 (1989)) (“In determining whether a hired
party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party’s right
to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished.”); cf. Bodie, supra note 2,
at 675 (“The ‘control’ test is the dominant standard for employment, both nationally and
internationally.”); Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A Characterization of Workers in Need of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357, 367 (2002) (“Control/
subordination is still the leading (and sometimes the single) characteristic of employment
relationships in many countries.”).
55
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1957).
56
Id. § 220 cmt. c.
57
Id. § 220(2). These factors are:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the
details of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist
without supervision; (d) the skill required in the particular occupation; (e) whether the
employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for
the person doing the work; (f ) the length of time for which the person is employed; (g)
the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the work
is a part of the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties believe
they are creating the relation of master and servant; and (j) whether the principal is or
is not in business.
Id. The Restatement Third of Agency has adapted the language of these doctrines by changing
“servant” to “employee,” but the doctrines remain relatively the same. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (2006).
58
The Supreme Court has made the common-law “control” test into the default test for
“employee” whenever used without further explanation in a federal statute. See Reid, 490 U.S. at
739–40 (“In the past, when Congress has used the term ‘employee’ without defining it, we have
concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as
understood by common-law agency doctrine.”).
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specifically exclude independent contractors, and so-called “newsboys”
were held to be statutory employees for purposes of the Act, even
though they were considered independent contractors under common
law.59 However, the NLRA was amended in 1947 to specifically exclude
independent contractors from coverage.60 There is one statutory
alternative to the control test—the “economic realities” or “economic
dependence” test, which is used by the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the Family & Medical Leave Act. Because these statutes specifically
define “employ” to include “suffer or permit to work,”61 the definition of
employee includes workers beyond the reach of the common law agency
test.62 The economic realities test thereby covers poorer or less
economically independent workers, even if their working relationship is
legally structured to provide less control to the hiring party.63
Over time, different sets of workers have fallen into the gap
between the “employee” category and the “independent contractor”
category. The aforementioned newsboys were an early example. More
recently, delivery drivers have experienced a wave of litigation over
their employment status, as FedEx and other companies have tried to
restructure the relationship to make the drivers independent
contractors.64 Even exotic dancers have had their employment status
litigated.65 However, the emergence of “platform,” “on-demand
economy,” “sharing economy,” or “gig economy” workers has offered a
new and purportedly existential challenge to the legal concept of
employment. Rather than providing their services directly to a firm,
platform workers are matched with a consumer of their services
through an internet intermediary. These intermediaries describe
themselves as matching services, rather than employers. For example,
the ride-sharing services Uber and Lyft do not, they argue, hire drivers
to provide rides on the companies’ behalf; rather, they provide a

59

N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 127 (1944) (holding that the news
vendors in question were “subject, as a matter of economic fact, to the evils the statute was
designed to eradicate”).
60
Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-87 (1988)).
61
29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
62
See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (noting that the FLSA
“stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a
strict application of traditional agency law principles”); see also Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v.
Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302 (1985) (citing Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 366
U.S. 28, 33 (1961)) (“The test of employment under the Act is one of economic reality . . . .”).
63
See, e.g., Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that
migrant pickle harvesters were employees under the FLSA).
64
Bodie, supra note 2, at 718–20.
65
McFeeley v. Jackson St. Ent., LLC, 825 F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 2016).
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platform for drivers and riders to match up with each other for mutually
beneficial transactions.66 In suits against the ride-sharing services,
however, representatives for classes of these drivers have characterized
themselves as traditional employees, albeit with untraditional firm
architecture.67
These platform workers—which also include coders, data-entry
providers, home repair servicers, and deliverers—have created conflict
over their appropriate legal categorization. Their jobs are flexible and
allow the worker (within certain incentive schemes) to choose when to
work. Some commentators have argued that the platform workers are
straightforward employees.68 Others have argued that on-demand
workers have sufficient flexibility in their work to qualify as
independent contractors.69 Still others have argued for a third category
of workers, neither employees nor independent contractors, to cover this
new category of work.70 Much of the litigation surrounding this issue is
still in stasis.71 The confusion of courts over this question is represented
in this quote by Judge Chhabria: “[T]he jury in this case will be handed
a square peg and be asked to choose between two round holes.”72
Like the dramatists, platform workers fall into a gray area between
the categories of independent contractor and employee. The history of
the dramatists—in both economic negotiations and litigation
maneuvers—has applications for how we should characterize platform
workers going forward.
III. LESSONS FROM THE DRAMATISTS FOR PLATFORM WORKERS
Employment is about team production. Employees are part of an
economic firm; they have removed themselves from the traditional

66

See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1137, 1141 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(describing Uber’s contentions about its relationship with its drivers), vacated, No. 13-cv-03826EMC, 2016 WL6997166 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
67
See id. at 1137, 1148–52. (describing whether the relationship between Uber and its drivers
satisfies the “control” test).
68
See, e.g., Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risak, Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co.: Platforms As
Employers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 619, 636–41
(2016); Julia Tomassetti, Does Uber Redefine the Firm? The Postindustrial Corporation and
Advanced Information Technology, 34 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1 (2017).
69
See Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1511, 1541 (2016).
70
See, e.g., SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL FOR
MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY WORK: THE “INDEPENDENT WORKER”
(2015), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_cen
tury_work_krueger_harris.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KH5-PSG9].
71
Cherry, supra note 6, at 578.
72
Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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market contracting process and instead provide their labor as part of a
firm.73 The firm is the mechanism by which production can be
coordinated amongst many when their inputs are not easily
distinguishable in the final product.74 Employees participate in this
ongoing joint production as part of the firm through the employment
relationship.75
Dramatists are not employees because they operate outside of the
team production process in significant respects. True, dramatists must
collaborate with numerous participants—directors, actors, stagehands,
funders, choreographers—in bringing a theater production to life. But
dramatists stand apart in one important respect: they retain
intellectual property rights over their dramatic works. Because they
hold copyright to their plays and musicals, they have the traditional
ownership prerogatives of control over use and profits. This difference
between dramatists and screenwriters is a critical one. Screenwriters
typically do not retain their copyright; these rights are either sold with
the script, if written independently, or go directly to the screenwriter’s
employer if the script was written through a work-for-hire relationship.
Screenwriters thus become part of a team; their work is owned by the
firm that is producing the movie, whether it be a production company
or a studio.76 Dramatists, on the other hand, may license their work for
a particular production, but their Guild expects them to retain
copyright. The dramatists’ intellectual property rights over their work
has been “the bedrock constant around which all theater-making has
been organized.”77
This retention of intellectual property rights has important
ramifications for team production and the working relationship. We
manage most business enterprises through firms because we need firms
to manage the process of production and then manage the distribution
of the gains from that process.78 Screenwriters put their contributions

73

For further development of this concept, see Bodie, supra note 2.
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779 (1972) (defining team production as “production in
which 1) several types of resources are used and 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs
of each cooperating resource”).
75
Bodie, supra note 2, at 705–06.
76
Fisk, supra note 32, at 240 (“Knowing that film and TV are collaborative media in which
authorship is collective, [screenwriters] are willing to trade ownership of the copyright in their
work for access to the resources and collaborations that will get their ideas made into movies or
TV shows.”).
77
Weidman, supra note 10, at 641.
78
Under the Alchian and Demsetz definition, team production takes several types of resources
and then creates a product that is not “a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating resource.”
Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 74, at 779.
74
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into the team’s overall mix of resources and generally do not retain any
ongoing copyright powers. As such, they are stuck in the muck with
everyone else and must depend on the firm to manage the distribution
of gains. Dramatists, on the other hand, seek to pull out their
contribution from the team process and keep that for themselves. Their
intellectual property rights allow them to keep their input separate in
important respects. As such, they stand outside the team—and are not
considered employees.
There are certain practical differences between playwriting and
screenwriting that lend themselves to the different postures that these
artists take. Plays are more of a stand-alone product; they enjoy at least
a limited independent market of readers, and they can be produced over
and over again by different sets of actors, directors, and producers.
Screenplays, on the other hand, do not have significant stand-alone
value and are almost always only produced once. But at the same time,
both the dramatist and the screenwriter depend on a host of other
participants to bring their words to life. A play cannot be truly
appreciated unless it is put on stage. If they chose to, dramatists could
consign themselves to a team production process by handing over their
IP rights to a firm.79 But as currently constructed, dramatists are not
employees because they keep their contributions separable from the
team.
Platform workers are not generally in a position to retain
continuing property rights, intellectual or otherwise, over their work.
But the concept of team production remains critical to determining
whether they are employees or independent contractors. If the platform
worker can separate out some portion of the value of her labor and can
use it separately from the team, that worker is more likely to be
independent from the team and therefore not an employee. On the other
hand, if the workers’ contributions inure to the good of the team and
primarily benefit the team going forward, then employment is more
apropos. This contrast will generally play out in the piece of ongoing
“property” that is relevant to most businesses: goodwill, brand, and
reputation. Instead of having a play or music to provide continuing
value from past labor, most employees will look to their past experience,
successful job performance, customer relationships, and co-worker
reputation as part of their “individual capital” that they carry forward.
If this capital generally goes to the firm’s reputational capital, then the

79

Even novelists can work as part of a team, and a firm can own the novel’s copyright. See
Anthony J. Casey & Andres Sawicki, Copyright in Teams, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1684–86 (2013)
(discussing the collaborative production of novels through which the firm owns the copyright and
is considered the author).
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worker is an employee. If the worker pulls out this reputational capital
for herself, then she is an independent contractor.
Uber provides an example of the difference between employee and
independent contractor in the platform economy. Uber drivers do create
individual reputational capital through their labor. Their first names
appear to customers; they are individually rated by customers, and that
rating appears as part of their profile; and they interact personally with
customers and can establish a relationship.80 However, most of the
reputational capital that drivers accrue is going to benefit the team—
Uber. Customers use the Uber app, and the app controls the pool of
drivers that can be chosen. Customers see only first names of drivers
and are not given any contact information for drivers.81 Uber takes
significant steps to vet its drivers and requires background checks and
car inspections.82 Those certifications as well as a driver’s customer
ratings are not portable; they are usable only through Uber. Uber’s goal
is not to create relationships between customers and individual drivers;
it is to create relationships between customers and Uber. Thus, even
though drivers are individually providing rides to customers and
getting paid for each ride, their contributions to the team are not
separable in the ways that the dramatists’ contributions are. Individual
drivers are not providing rides as themselves; they are providing rides
as Uber drivers. As one court described it, “Uber is deeply involved in
marketing its transportation services, qualifying and selecting drivers,
regulating and monitoring their performance, disciplining (or
terminating) those who fail to meet standards, and setting prices.”83
Uber’s driving services are provided through the team, and the team
receives the ongoing reputational capital. This critical distinction is
what makes Uber drivers employees.84
Uber could structure itself in a way that made the drivers more
akin to independent contractors. It could construct its app more like a
marketplace for individual drivers, in which each driver set the rates,

80

See Cherry, supra note 6, at 597; Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform
Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 479, 490–91 (2016); Tomassetti, supra
note 68, at 9.
81
Aslam, Farrar & Others v. Uber, Case No. 2202550/2015, U.K. Employment Tribunal,
¶¶ 90–91, Oct. 28, 2016, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/aslam-and-far
rar-v-uber-reasons-20161028.pdf [https://perma.cc/247A-LQKD] (discussing absence of information between driver and passenger); Tomassetti, supra note 68, at 25 (discussing Uber process).
82
Rogers, supra note 80, at 490–91.
83
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
84
See also Guy Davidov, The Status of Uber Drivers: A Purposive Approach, SPAN. LAB. L. &
EMP. REL. J. (forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2877134 [https://perma.cc/L7DB-QA
RZ] (describing Uber drivers as employees based on their democratic deficits and economic
dependence).
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established the ground rules for the ride, and received independent
reputational capital that was portable to other transportation markets.
Customers would be looking for individual drivers and would view Uber
as more of a market: a food court with different offerings from different
vendors. Instead, Uber offers the Uber experience, and customers rely
on Uber to make sure that experience is provided.
The platform economy’s radical technological changes do allow for
teams to break down more easily into individual actors, and for those
individual actors to act independently within the platform. But the
nature of companies such as Uber and the businesses that they are in
makes it more likely for them to orient themselves toward team
production rather than individual markets. Customers generally do not
want to have to vet a set of drivers individually; they want Uber to do
it for them. They do not want to establish relationships with specific
drivers; they want to have a driver available as soon as possible by
drawing from a large pool.85 Uber is a transportation company, not a
technology company, and it is hard to imagine it being successful if it
were to reconstruct itself as a pure market. But other platform
companies may be able to work as a market more successfully and
thereby create a true marketplace for independent contractors.
Even if we ultimately characterize certain platform workers as
independent contractors, we may still find aspects of the dramatists’
dilemma: a need, or at least a desire, to provide them with certain of
the protections generally afforded to employees. And we may conclude
that it makes sense to carve out a middle ground between employees
and independent contractors with respect to certain legal doctrines. The
Dramatists Guild seeks to obtain the collective-bargaining protections
afforded to employee unions in order to negotiate more forcefully with
producers and enforce standard terms and conditions for dramatists’
work. The Guild has pursued legislation amending antitrust laws to
permit dramatists to negotiate collectively, even if they are not
employees. Such concerns could also apply to platform workers who
may be considered independent but similarly wish to band together for
bargaining purposes.86 We may find that various aspects of the
employment relationship fit broader or narrower categories, and should

85

See Sheelah Kolhatkar, The Anti-Uber, NEW YORKER, Oct. 10, 2016, at 40, 45 (noting that
“customers summoning Ubers want their cars to come quickly” and that the company wants the
service “to be as reliable as running water”).
86
For a discussion of antitrust as applied to Uber, see Sanjukta Paul, Uber as For-Profit
Hiring Hall: A Price-Fixing Paradox and Its Implications, 38 BERK. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 233, https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2817653 [https://perma.cc/5YZA-FTTZ].
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be expanded or shrunk as appropriate.87 An “independent worker”
category may be more appropriate for some employees if it offers a
better regulatory mix of employer responsibilities.88 The legal and
economic “disruption” caused by platform companies should prompt a
reevaluation of specific legal regimes and their fit with the employment
relationship.
At the same time, however, it is important not to lose sight of what
the employment relationship does provide. Employment allows for
meaningful collaboration on an ongoing basis through firms. Team
production is difficult to manage through pure market relationships.
Firms are important within our economy and are likely to remain
important, even in the face of platform technology. As such, the choice
between firm and market will remain a significant economic and legal
choice. We cannot let firms like Uber receive the benefits of team
production without the concomitant responsibilities. When companies
choose the firm structure to provide their goods or services, they must
treat their workers as employees. That remains true even in this new
economy.
CONCLUSION
The critical question to ask when it comes to platform workers is
this: are they part of a firm or are they working as individual
businesses? Are they providing their labor as part of a team, or do they
hold on to individual capital throughout their transactions? The
dramatists have chosen to conduct their work as separate artists;
screenwriters, as part of a team. This distinction should provide the
best way forward as we endeavor to categorize an ever-wider array of
workers and their work. Once categorized, we need to address their
needs as workers in tandem with our categorization. Certain
protections that are currently tied to employment may make more sense
applied to a broader set of contractual participants. But understanding
the underlying core of the employment relationship, and categorizing
workers accordingly, will help us then move on to reassessing labor and
employment laws and applying them more appropriately to those who
need their protections.

87

Cf. Davidov, supra note 54, at 371 (discussing the category of dependent contractors).
See HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 70. Orly Lobel has recently argued that it makes sense
to extend certain “employment” laws such as antidiscrimination protections, collective bargaining
rights, and worker safety regulations to all workers, including independent contractors. Orly
Lobel, The Gig Economy & the Future of Employment and Labor Law 9–14, https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2848456 [https://perma.cc/8G8L-QW2J].
88

